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## **‘Modal’ *that* as determiner and pronoun: the primacy of the cognitive-interactive dimension**

### **ABSTRACT**

In this article, I examine the ‘modal’ or ‘empathetic’ (Lyons, 1977: 677) use of the distal (or “non-proximal”) determiner/pronoun *that*: namely, where the intended referent may have just been evoked in the immediately prior discourse, but where the distal pronoun *that*, not the ‘in-focus’ *it* or the ‘activated’, proximal *this* is used. The rationale behind the choice of this particular type of indexical seems to be that the speaker is distancing him/herself from the referent, not wishing to ascribe actuality to it in the way that would be the case if either *it* or *this* were used instead. Examination of this particular value of *that* leads to the hypothesis that the principles underlying the choice of *that* as opposed to *this* or *it* generally are not derived ‘objectively’, as it were, from their situational use in terms of degrees of proximity of a referent or demonstratum to the speaker or hearer, nor primarily in terms of attention focus. They are, rather, social and cognitive, and play an important interactional role in the construction of discourse

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

In this article,<sup>1</sup> I will be mainly examining one use of the English so-called “distal” demonstrative determiner/pronoun *that*, namely its “modal” or “empathetic” use, as illustrated in (1), an attested example:

- (1) “The New Tate changes the whole structure of things. The Royal Academy will have to adapt to *that*,” he [M. Rosenthal, the Royal Academy’s impresario] said. (...) He [Rosenthal] said he sensed things were changing within the notoriously conservative R.A. “This is not the time to say what will happen to the summer show, but I feel something is in the air. I may be the Academy’s black sheep which they indulge terribly, but I think the election of Philip King as president showed *that* change<sup>2</sup> ...” (*The Guardian*).

Clearly, in both anaphoric references highlighted in italics in this example, the speaker, representing the “notoriously conservative” (in the words of the journalist) Royal Academy, is distancing himself (and indirectly the RA itself) from his intended referent (‘the New Tate and its changing the whole structure of things within the Art museum/gallery world’), not wishing to identify with it. Even though in both instances, the discourse referent retrieved via these occurrences is salient and recently evoked, neither the “proximal” variant *this*,

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<sup>2</sup> This is in fact a determiner use of *that* rather than a complementizer use (as may be imagined in the absence of further context): in the original article from which (1) is taken, the word *change* was followed by a full stop.

nor (in the case of the initial pronominal occurrence) the “in-focus” *it*, was used.

Another attested example, this time an oral one from the conference at which the paper on which this article is based was presented, is given as (2):

- (2) [DP, introducing R. Langacker’s paper at the conference on Linguistics and the English Language, UTM, 8 July 2000]  
I’d like to introduce Professor Ronald Langacker (...everyone says *that!*)...

Again, the referent of what I call (Cornish 1999: §2.4.1, pp. 41-3) the “antecedent-trigger” predication (the initial clause of the fragment) is salient at the point where the anaphor occurs - however, the demonstrative pronoun, together with its containing predication as a whole, has in fact created from this context a generic representation of the content of that predication, conceived as a stereotype. This is also an instance of discourse deixis (see §2.3 below).

On the basis of quite a wide-ranging corpus of this use taken from speech and writing, I would like to re-examine the standard view of deixis as essentially involving relative (geographical, and derivatively, temporal) objective *distance* from the speaker’s “zero-point” within the deictic framework. This corresponds to the *origo* in Bühler’s (1934) account, that is, the time and place of utterance, and the identity of the speaker (cf. Lyons 1977: 638). There is now quite a wide body of work which favours this challenge (e.g. Cheshire 1996, Glover 2000, Maes 1996, Strauss 1993, Laury 1997, Himmelmann 1996, Hanks 1992, Aoyama 1995, Leonard 1995, Lapaire & Rotgé 1991), though not all share the same view regarding the principles to which the various demonstrative expressions are sensitive. One point on which they do agree, however, is that the choice of one rather than another of the members of a closed system of indexical expressions is a discourse-creative act, manifesting different types of socio-discoursal relationships between speaker and addressee, as well as the viewpoint from which the referent is envisaged. Such a use is both a function of the pre-existing context and serves to change it at the same time. I shall try to make precise the discourse values which the various members of the set *this/that/it* realize, and, once this is achieved, to show that the Columbia School’s account of the system of ‘deixis’ (involving relative degrees of insistent ‘pointing’ toward the intended referent) may be seen to flow from these more basic cognitive-discourse values.

## 2. DISCOURSE FUNCTIONS REALIZABLE BY *THAT* AND *THIS*

### 2.1 *Situational reference*

The standard and traditionally basic use of the demonstratives is to refer directly to entities located in or derivable from the situation of utterance. A typical example is (3) below, from Cornish (1999: 26):

- (3) [It is dusk, and John and Mary are returning from a shopping trip. As John is parking the car, Mary exclaims:]  
 Good God! Look at *that* incredibly bright light! [Mary gestures towards a point in the evening sky] What on earth do you think it could be?

What are the distinctive features of this deictic reference via the demonstrative NP *that incredibly bright light*, in conjunction with Mary's pointing gesture towards the target object? Well, in (3) the object in question is available within the utterance situation, thereby assuming a certain degree of potential accessibility for the addressee. The speaker, adopting the "deictic procedure" (in Ehlich's 1982 terms: see (4) below), assumes that her addressee is capable of retrieving the intended referent on the basis of the utterance context of which both parties are an integral part. Ehlich's definitions of the discourse-cognitive (orienting) functions of deixis and anaphora are given under (4):

- (4) Deixis is a linguistic<sup>3</sup> means for achieving focussing of the hearer's attention towards a specific item which is part of the respective deictic space. (Ehlich, 1982: 325).  
 Anaphora is a linguistic means for having the hearer continue (sustain) a previously established focus towards a specific item on which he had oriented his attention earlier. (Ehlich, 1982:330).

Deixis under this view may be seen as involving the use of the speech situation (the (deictic) *ground*, in Hanks's 1992 terminology) to profile a *figure* (a new referent or a new conception of an existing referent within the discourse registry); while anaphora consists in the retrieval from within a given ground of an already existing 'figure', together with its 'ground', the anaphoric predication acting to extend that ground (see Kleiber 1994, Ch. 3).

In example (3), then, the speaker also assumes that the addressee's current attention focus is not already centred upon the intended referent at the time of utterance. Her mode of reference constitutes an instruction to the addressee to focus his attention on the object pointed to (as in Ehlich's 1982 definition of the deictic procedure), entering a representation of it into his mental discourse model by opening a referent file containing this new topical referent. This instruction is made in terms of the current utterance context by taking cognizance of the respective orientations of speaker and addressee, with the former's index finger pointing to a particular luminous point in the sky. This gesture leads the latter to locate this referent within its context (the region of dusk sky around the luminous point in question) and to make that luminous point stand out from this context, simultaneously placing that context in the

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<sup>3</sup> I would take issue with Ehlich, however, on the purported restriction of deixis to expression via *linguistic* means (though this is no doubt a correct characterization as far as anaphora is concerned). After all, deixis may well be realised via a gesture, or prosodically via a high pitch accent.

background in relation to the focussed object. This “figure/ground” distinction is extremely important in the operation of indexical reference (cf., e.g., Hanks 1992, Laury 1997). As many have pointed out, it is actually the gesture, not the linguistic expression per se, which enables the demonstratum, and hence the intended referent (the two are not necessarily identical) to be located. This type of deictic reference corresponds to the sub-category of deixis called *Deixis ad Oculos* by Bühler (1934/1982), though of course it is not restricted to actually visible referents.

Note that this “direct pointing” use of *that* would be analyzed by proponents of the standard view of deictic reference as being a function of the *spatial distance* of the intended referent with respect to the speaker (cf. the term *distal demonstrative* commonly used to designate *that*). However, it can also be viewed as primarily subject to socio-cognitive considerations, in serving to characterize the intended referent as not falling within the speaker’s discourse sphere (see especially Cheshire 1996, Glover 2000 on this point, as well as Laury 1997 in relation to the more-or-less equivalent Finnish demonstrative *tuo*). I will be coming back to this notion repeatedly in what follows.

## 2.2 ‘Recognitional’ or ‘reminder’ reference

It is in fact *that* and not *this* which realizes the particular value in discourse termed the *recognitional* (see Himmelmann 1996) or *reminder* (Gundel et al. 1993) use of demonstratives. This value involves the retrieval of some personally- or culturally-shared experience or situation which speaker and addressee are assumed to have stored in their long-term memories, and which is reactivated via the use of *that* (usually in its determiner function). The effect is to signal a sort of “complicity” between the two (or more) discourse partners. The attested (written, but nevertheless fairly informal) examples (5) and (6) illustrate:

- (5) Tony Blair was said to be on the phone last week to his German oppo, Chancellor Schröder, trying to talk through an upbeat final instalment of *that* dismal industrial soap opera called Longbridge... (*The Guardian*)
- (6) [Sticker on rear window of car]  
Mind *that* child! He may be deaf.

The reference via the demonstrative NP *that dismal industrial soap opera called Longbridge* is a “complicitous”, tongue-in-cheek allusion to the sale of Rover by the German firm BMW (as if to mean “you know the one I’m talking about!”), which had been front-page news over the previous weeks in *The Guardian*, as well as in the press and media generally; so the journalist could justifiably assume that a representation of this situation would be prominently stored in the reader’s episodic memory. The subjective nature of this reference

is palpably evident in the presence of the adjective *dismal* as well as of the compound noun modifier *soap opera* within the expression used.

In (6), determiner *that* also effects a “reminder” to the addressee (the driver of the car assumed to be just behind the one on which the sticker is displayed), but this time the predication and positional context invokes a stereotypical *frame* assumed to be buried deep in drivers’ long-term (semantic) memories: such a frame consists of a representation of a situation (feared by all motorists) whereby a reckless child, without checking beforehand, suddenly rushes out into the street and into the trajectory of a vehicle, and is killed or maimed as a result. The use of the deictic, in conjunction with the utterance situation assumed by the text as a whole, serves to activate and extract this stereotypical representation from semantic memory and to focus attention on its central protagonist, the sub-category of pedestrian corresponding to a “reckless child” (the reference is generic). The use of determiner *that* here introducing a superordinate noun (*child*) is equivalent to the exclamation “you know the type I mean”. This is also the case with the use of determiner *that* in (5), as we have seen.

Cognitively speaking, “reminder” references via determiner *that* function exactly like the situational reference of this form type (cf. §2.1): in the latter type of use, the deictic expression together with its predication and accompanying gesture serve to construct a partially new discourse representation out of the representation of the utterance context which the addressee will have set up immediately prior to the indexical reference. At the same time, it effects a “figure-ground” differentiation within it, making the “figure” (the demonstratum or the intended referent itself) into a salient topic which the subsequent discourse is expected to develop. On the other hand, in the former type of reference (recognitional), the deictic does exactly the same cognitive job, but on the basis of a representation of a situation assumed to be shared by the discourse participants within their semantic or episodic memories.

### 2.3 Discourse deixis

The type of use of demonstrative expressions known as *discourse deixis* provides the basis for the existence of anaphora, according to Lyons (1977, Vol. 2; 1979) and Bühler (1934/1982). *Contra* Lakoff (1974: 345), discourse deixis is not (yet) anaphora, however, since its function is essentially deictic (as its name suggests). It involves a cognitive pointing towards the result of processing a predication (or a part of a predication) in surrounding discourse, and (in English) may be realized by both *this* and *that*, whether as determiners or pronouns. The attested examples (7) and (8a), and the constructed example (9), illustrate ((8a) is presented in partially transcribed form: no capital letters for sentence-initial words, ‘-’ for a short pause, and contrastively-accented syllables in small capitals):

- (7) (...) Rose Brocklebank said: “We were trapped, which at the time was reason to panic. I shouted at the top of my voice and at *that* point the Fire Brigade came to our rescue...” (*Adscene*, Canterbury)
- (8) (a) [Interview with Jonathan Porritt, then leader of the environmental pressure group Friends of the Earth, by Nicholas Witchell, *BBC Radio 5*, 16 October, 1994]  
 NW: do you think that he [Prince Charles] will become a GREEN monarch ?  
 JP: well, yes, but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to *THAT*  
 NW: -- what, that he will ever one day beCOME king?  
 JP: yes.
- (b) ...JP: # well, yes, but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to *it*.
- (9) Listen to *this*: a man went into a butcher’s shop wanting to buy a whole pig, and..... (constructed example)

In (7), the demonstrative NP *that point* refers to the moment in the sequence of events narrated when the speaker shouted at the top of her voice.

Nicholas Witchell’s question in (8a) was about whether Prince Charles would be a ‘green’ (i.e. environmentally-conscious) monarch, not about whether in fact he would ever actually become king one day. That is, what is highlighted in the context constituted by this question, given the global topic at issue, is Prince Charles’s ecological credentials. The fact that he will become king is presupposed: the pronominal adjective *GREEN* was accented and pronounced with high pitch, while the head noun *monarch* was unaccented and carried a low level of pitch. The interviewee, however, although he replies to the question posed (*Well, yes..*), sought to call its presupposition into question by using a strongly accented demonstrative pronoun (*THAT*) fulfilling a deictic function, in order to make accessible and salient an item of information which, in the context set up by the interpretation of the initial question, was in the background, not the foreground, of attention. Note the ‘metadiscursive’ question by the interviewer immediately following this ‘discourse-deictic’ reference concerning the meaning intended by the interviewee, and the latter’s confirmation of his interpretation. The information-structure representation of this segment of discourse may be formulated as in (8c):

- (8) (c) Presupposition structure of the complement clause in line 1 in (8a) :  
 “that Prince Charles [will] become an X monarch”

Assertion : “X = “environmentally-conscious””

Effect on this presupposition structure created by the interpretation of *THAT* within its predication context : “that Prince Charles [will] become monarch”

Observe also that the ‘anaphoric procedure’, in Ehlich’s (1982) sense (see (4)), would certainly not have been adequate to the task in hand here. That is, in (8b) *#but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to it*, *it* would necessarily be interpreted as referring to what was in focus at that particular point in the discourse, namely ‘that Prince Charles will be a “green” monarch’. This interpretation, a status marked by the crosshatch prefixed to the alternative initial response by Jonathan Porritt in (8a), would be somewhat incoherent here, in the absence of special intonation.

Finally, in (9), the “proximal”, accented demonstrative pronoun *this*, used “cataphorically”, is setting up a discourse node corresponding to a narrated event, an event which is flagged as being of some potential significance for the addressee, and with which the speaker is personally involved.

So again, discourse deixis, like its situational and recognitional or reminder counterparts, involves setting up a figure (the intended discourse referent) from within the ground in which it is embedded, and signalling that this figure is to be the subject of the subsequent discourse. The essential difference is in the nature of the ‘ground’ representation: unlike the two previous cases, this is not based on the utterance situation, nor on shared representations in episodic or semantic long-term memory, but on that of the immediately prior or subsequent (see example (9)) discourse.

## 2.4 “Modal” deictic reference

This brings us to the core topic of this article, the so-called “modal” or “empathetic” use of *that*. Lyons (1977: 677) defines this as the selection of a form within a spatial or temporal deictic opposition in terms of relative “distance” from the speaker (and/or proximity to the hearer) which is not expected on a purely spatial or temporal basis; rather, the opposing form is chosen “when the speaker is personally involved with the entity, situation or place to which he is referring or is identifying himself with the attitude or viewpoint of the addressee. (...) At this point deixis merges with modality”. Lyons (1982: 113-14) also suggests that in terms of the more subjective aspects of deixis, no sharp distinction between deixis and modality can be drawn. This is particularly true, he points out (1982: 114), in the case of the cross-linguistic distinction between the categories of tense (which is deictically-based) and mood.

Examples (1) and (2) illustrated three instances of this type of use. The following attested examples provide further illustration:

(10) [Interview, *BBC Radio 4*]

...I’m not going to the Eisteddfod this year. Work doesn’t allow *that*.

(11) ...“Do we want machines which are more intelligent than humans, or should we call a



halt to it?" he asked. "We are still a long way from *that decision* but I think we should be realistically talking about it...To say it couldn't happen is to put our heads in the sand..." (*The Guardian*)

- (12) [Bank advertisement, "Broadsheet N° 1"]

The Banks Debate

Did you know that there's a proposal to nationalise the four main clearing banks - Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and National Westminster?

*That's* what the Labour Party's National Executive Committee (NEC) recommended last August in a pamphlet called "Banking and Finance".

The government and the Prime Minister are against it...

But all the same, the proposal was passed by the 1976 Labour Party Conference...

- (13) ...A hairpin structure could hold the point of splicing in its stem, but *that* would necessitate ligation from one chain across to the opposite side of the helix...  
(an attested scientific extract cited in Myers 1988: 4)

- (14) ...What is quite clear is the contempt Mr Major has for Mrs Thatcher's sniping from the sidelines.

In his first frontal onslaught on Baroness Thatcher, Mr Major says: "In retrospect, I hope that none of my successors are treated in *that* way". (*The Independent*)

Here, we have three pronominal occurrences (in (10), (12), and (13), and two as a determiner (in (11) and (14)). In all cases, there is evidence of a modal distancing on the speaker's or writer's part in regard to the intended referent, within the predications containing these occurrences. In (10), this is achieved via the denial of the actuality of the event denoted in the initial sentence; in (11), through the assertion of the extended time-span between the time of utterance and the possible event of a decision being taken which would stop the machines referred to in the initial question becoming more intelligent than humans. Interestingly, there is a change of stance on the writer's part in the immediately following clause, when he asserts the need for us to start thinking now about the problem just evoked. He refers back to this problem with the modally-neutral pronoun *it*, and no longer with *that*, a factor which, I would argue, signals a shift in the point of view hitherto established.

In (12), the knowledge that the "Broadsheet" in question was produced by a banking consortium with the express aim of alerting the public to the risk (as it saw it) of the then Labour government implementing the Labour Party's NEC proposal to nationalize the four main UK clearing banks, together with the presentation of this information in the form of a question in the initial sentence, provides substantial motivation for interpreting the referent of *that* in the second sentence as a possible event which the authors do *not* want to see translated into reality.

In (13), as Myers (1988) points out, the pronoun *that* is appropriate since the propositional content it points to (“the fact that a hairpin structure *could* hold the point of splicing in its stem”), as well as the pronoun’s immediate predication context (...*would necessitate ligation*...), are both heavily qualified. Hence the writer here is clearly distancing himself from the proposition evoked, which is conceived as a hypothetical situation. As in all the instances of demonstrative deixis we have seen so far, there is an implication of contrast, a property which is indeed a distinctive feature of demonstratives generally.

Finally, in (14), the context of the demonstrative determiner also clearly shows the negative light in which the speaker casts the referent - which is raised to a generic concept via the head noun *way*, as well as by the choice of the generalizing demonstrative *that*. As in all of these instances, there is contextual, corroborating evidence here of the modally distancing value of the distal demonstrative *that*.

The common thread running through these ‘modal’ uses, then, seems to be the fact that the speaker is not wishing to associate him/herself or identify with the referent, or with a group or individual holding a particular position in a debate. This is particularly true in examples (11), (12), (13) (where the possibility evoked of the hairpin structure holding the point of splicing in its stem could well constitute a position held by a fellow scientist within a debate on this issue) and (14). That is, the speaker is tacitly instructing the addressee to place the referent *outside* his/her (i.e. the speaker’s) discourse-cognitive sphere, in terms of a particular type of interaction both with the addressee or reader, and with the group or individual whose position is rejected. The addressee or reader in these examples is tacitly appealed to as a witness, or as a potential ally in the speaker/writer’s argumentative stance. Strauss (1993) and others (e.g. Cheshire 1996, Laury 1997, Glover 2000) suggest that what she calls “non-phoric” *that* functions interactively to create a sort of solidarity between the discourse participants, establishing common ground.<sup>4</sup> Cheshire (1996: 372) notes that, in her corpus of conversational utterances, “the proximal-distal dimension [in connection with the choice of *that* versus *this* and vice versa] is rarely relevant”, “the spatial dimension of their meaning [being] virtually always neutralised”.<sup>5</sup> The existence of a relation of solidarity between the participants may well be the case in (11), (13) (an extract from a scientific text where the need to establish “publicly verifiable” facts is paramount), and (14) - but not self-evidently in (10) or (12). My feeling is that this interpretative effect is a type of inference which may be drawn from the use of *that* in context, rather

<sup>4</sup> See also Maes (1996), who invokes the notion of *other [i.e. different] referential domain*, ([ORD]), as distinct from the default deictic domain constituted by the current speaker’s construction of discourse (the DRD, or *deictic reference domain*).

<sup>5</sup> See also the conclusion reached by Glover (2000: 925) on the basis of a corpus of urban planning negotiation interactions.

than it being a basic motivating principle determining its use. Maes's characterization, as we shall see later on, is more general, and accounts for all these examples.

Given that there is a common thread running through the uses of *that* illustrated so far, we may legitimately regard this "modal" use of *that* as basic, the corresponding use of *this* being a function of the speaker's wish to identify with the referent, placing it *within* his/her discourse-cognitive sphere. Strauss (1993) gives a number of spontaneous spoken extracts which show the heightened emotivity and subjectivity of the use of *this* in referring to objects, propositions or situations in which the speaker is closely involved personally. See also in this regard the typical "focussing" new-topic-introducing use of *this* as illustrated in (9), as well as the use of "indefinite-*this*" in familiar, spoken English to introduce a referent which the speaker feels is of some importance, for example in a narrative, and which is thereby tagged as likely to persist for at least several predications in the ensuing discourse. (15) is an attested example from Schiffrin (1994:112):

- (15) Because there's *this* guy Louie Gelman, he went to a BIG specialist, and the guy...analyzed it WRONG.

The context of the fragment in (15) is a conversation about what people do before they go to a doctor: the speaker in (15), in response to the suggestion of this topic (by Schiffrin herself), chose to tell a story about an acquaintance of his, Louie Gelman. Note the use of the existential, presentational construction *there's* + indefinite NP, showing that the determiner *this*, in spite of its morphology, is treated in this usage as indefinite, introducing a discourse-new referent, though at the same time, it establishes a specific discourse entity. Note also the left-detached context in which this demonstrative NP occurs, signalling a change of thematic or discourse unit. This function of *this* may be seen as close in value to the discourse-deictic function illustrated by the 'cataphoric' use of the pronoun *this* seen in example (9) above.

It is tempting to consider the other three major uses of the demonstratives (determiner and pronoun) as being subject to the same socio-discoursal constraints as is clearly the case with the modal, subjective use. Under this view, the geographical criterion invoked by standard accounts of deixis for the situational use can be seen as an epiphenomenon of the socio-discoursal values which the modal use manifests.

### 3. OTHER 'NON-SPATIAL' ACCOUNTS OF DEMONSTRATIVES

Let's look now at various similar accounts of the demonstrative determiners/pronouns, which also reject the "distance" parameter as providing

the basis for the functioning of such pairs (*this/that, now/then, here/there*). I begin with Strauss's (1993) study of demonstratives in a range of familiar, spoken registers within the Columbia School of Linguistics (see also Aoyama's 1995 study of the Japanese demonstratives, in comparison with that of Kuroda 1985, and Leonard's 1995 account of the Swahili ones within this framework).

### 3.1 Strauss (1993)

Strauss contains a critique of the standard "static" account of deictically used demonstratives in terms of the relative geographical location of their referents in relation to the speaker: "near the speaker = *this/this N*" and "far from the speaker = *that/that N*". She gives naturally-occurring spoken examples where *that*, for instance, is used by a speaker to refer to a physical entity which he describes via a gesture representing its shape (e.g. 1993: 414, where the speaker, Curt, mimics the shape of a car component), and where it is used anaphorically to refer back to something that has just been evoked. Examples of the latter in the present paper would be the first occurrence of *that* in example (1), and those in examples (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13). These are all examples of "modal" deixis. See also Maes's (1996) corpora of written data, which show that the equivalent Dutch pair of demonstrative determiners *deze* and *die* do not pattern in terms of "anaphoric" distance in the way predicted by the "locality" account. For the exophoric use of demonstrative pronouns, Janssen (1995) gives a very telling pair, from a medical dialogue:

- (16) a. Doctor: *Is **this** where it hurts?*  
           *Doet het zeer op **deze** plek?*
- b. Patient: *Yes, **that** is where it hurts.*  
           *Ja, op **die** plek.*

If the locality account of demonstrative use were strictly applied, we would expect the point indicated by the patient to be referred to via *this*, not *that*, since the spot in question is part of his own body, and so cannot be any closer to him.

It is true that proponents of the "relative-geographical-distance-of-referent-from-speaker" account of demonstratives would say that there is a "metaphorical" kind of distance involved here between the intended referent and the speaker, viewed in psychological terms. However, this analysis is not always possible for every occurrence of *that* in contrast to *this*, and in any case, it would completely fail to capture the interactional dimension which forms an integral aspect of the use of the demonstratives, according to Strauss, Cheshire and many others. Moreover, as Strauss points out (1993: 405), the results of an analysis of a 41,500 word database from a range of spoken genres (of which Strauss presents

a representative sample in her article) show that occurrences of *this* accounted for only 15% of the total number of occurrences of the three indexical forms *this*, *that* and *it* (in their plural as well as singular forms), while instances of *that* were twice as frequent (see her Table, 1, 1993: 406). As she observes, this patterning in natural spoken discourse is the exact opposite of what would be expected on the basis of the “distance” parameter. It also provides clear evidence that *that* is the unmarked member of the *this/that* opposition.

Strauss proposes a systemic analysis in terms of the so-called “Focus” system within the Columbia School of Linguistics (in fact, most CS linguists call this “Deixis”, reserving “Focus” for a slightly different phenomenon). That is, the semantic substance FOCUS has to do with the degree of attention which the speaker tacitly instructs the addressee to pay to the intended referent. The form *this* is then said to signal that the addressee needs to accord a HIGH degree of focus to the referent at issue, since the referent is an important one within the discourse under construction: its content is “new” to the discourse at the point of use. The form *that* is said to signal the need for a MEDIUM degree of focus on the intended referent, the referent being of intermediate importance for the discourse and constituting already-shared information for the addressee. Finally, *it* (which is not centrally examined in the article under discussion) is said to signal the need for only a LOW degree of focus, its referent being “unimportant” for the discourse and, as in the case of the use of *that*, representing already-shared information. This system is displayed in Figure 1 below (Strauss 1993: 404):

(17)	<u>Form</u>	<u>MEANING SIGNAL</u>	<u>Hearer</u>	<u>Referent</u>
degree of attention to pay to the referent	<b>This</b>	HIGH FOCUS	new information (not shared)	important
	<b>That</b>	MEDIUM FOCUS		
	<b>It</b>	LOW FOCUS	shared information	unimportant

Fig. 1. Strauss’s Schema of focus for demonstrative reference

The information listed under the “Hearer” and “Referent” columns is intended to be taken as a function of the speaker’s assessment, not in “absolute” terms. Strauss, then, characterizes what can be seen as the *marked* member of the tripartite system of Focus (*this*) as serving to “call a particular referent into the consciousness of the hearer. It is the most powerful of the forms, since it can convey meaning for brand new and previously unknown information.” (1993: 407).

The values which each demonstrative form-type encodes are conceived by Strauss as constituting “speaker stance”, in cognitive-interactional terms, relative not only to the intended referent, but to the addressee and to what is currently being done in terms of the creation of discourse. She gives examples (e.g. 1993: 410-11) where *that* is used in order to give a resumptive summary of the preceding discourse unit, thereby signalling the end of the current turn (e.g. *..That’s exactly the point.*), and where *this* is used both to forcefully underline the speaker’s point, and to indicate that the turn is still ongoing (e.g. *...This is the whole point. For example now...*). See also Lapaire & Rotgé’s (1991: §2) distinction in terms of the “psycho-grammatical” notions “non-closure” for *this* and “closure” for *that*.

Two immediate counterexamples to Strauss’s explanatory axioms would be examples (3) and (6) from the present paper, where in both cases (particularly in (6)), the speaker is directing the addressee’s attention by means not of *this*, but of *that*, to a referent which is both new (though admittedly “shared” - and hence “identifiable” - in terms of a stereotypical frame in the case of (6)) and important for the subsequent discourse. The Columbia School notion of a hierarchy of attention-directing form-types seems a little too strong in such cases. Rather than positing a scale of ATTENTION FOCUS in terms of strength of insistent pointing towards the intended referent, I think it is preferable to place greater theoretical weight on the notions of “speaker’s strong subjective involvement” in the case of *this*, and “speaker’s solidarity and co-alignment with the addressee” in the case of *that*. This is precisely the kind of account which Laury (1997) gives for the Finnish demonstratives *tämä* ‘this’, *tuo* ‘that’, and *se* ‘it/that/the’. The relative positions on the FOCUS continuum postulated by Strauss can then be seen to flow from these more basic systemic values.

### 3.2 Laury (1997) and Östman (1995) on the Finnish demonstratives

Laury (1997: 59) defines the “instructions for use” of the Finnish demonstratives as follows: *tämä* ‘this’ carries with it the tacit instruction to the addressee to place its referent “within [the speaker’s] current sphere”. This sphere may or may not also include the addressee. The speaker’s current sphere is at the same time partially defined by the occurrence of *tämä*. *Tuo* ‘that’, on the other hand, conveys the tacit instruction to place the intended referent *outside* the speaker’s current sphere, thereby also defining that sphere. Finally, the use of *se* ‘the’/‘it’/‘that’ has the speaker placing the intended referent within the addressee’s sphere. Following Hanks’s (1992) proposal for the analysis of demonstratives, Laury (*ibid*: 60) suggests that the Finnish demonstratives are best conceived as encoding both “characterizing” features, describing the given demonstrative’s referent (in the case of the three non-locative demonstrative form-types mentioned above, this would be “reference point”, i.e. ‘the one’),

and “relational” features, which specify the type of relationship which the demonstrative establishes between its referent and the indexical ground. In this connection, *tämä* and *se* are said to be “inclusive”, in that they both include the referent in (respectively) the speaker’s or the addressee’s current sphere, whereas *tuo* is claimed to be “exclusive” since it signals that the referent is excluded from the speaker’s and the addressee’s current sphere. The indexical ground is the speaker (and optionally also the addressee) for *tämä* and *tuo*, and the addressee for *se*.

Östman (1995) develops a very similar analysis of the Finnish demonstratives. His claim that what he calls “Affective” deixis is in fact cognitively basic with respect to the situational, discourse-deictic and recognitional uses, is in fact very close to my own in this article. However, he doesn’t develop this bold claim or give arguments for it to any extent. On this view, *s(i)e* is the neutral term in the triplet of Finnish indexical forms, *tää...* is the speaker-oriented one, and *tuo* is non-speaker oriented (1995: 265). According to Östman,

The *tää*- term is used for referents the speaker has empathy with, or is involved with. Thus, as a consequence, it will also be used for things proximal to the speaker. The *tuo*-term is used for cases where the speaker does not have empathy with the referent, or where s/he even has antipathy towards the referent - thus, as a consequence it is used of distal things, and of referents that are new, because they are unknown. The *sie*-term, finally, is basically used when empathy, involvement, and affect is not at issue in the communicative situation.

Three examples involving Affective deixis (negative in (18), positive in (19), and neutral in (20)) follow:

(18) Tuo Väyrynen on sitten maailman suurin älykääpiö (Östman’s (24))  
‘That [TUO] Väyrynen is really the world’s biggest pighead.’

(19) Tä(m)ä Fillmore on sitten fiksu tyyppi. (Östman’s (25))  
‘This [TAA] Fillmore is a really sharp guy.’

(20) No, se Donner on nyt sellainen kun se aina on ollut. (Östman’s (26))  
‘Well, that [SIE] Donner is the way he’s always been.’

According to Östman (1995: 270), interactively, the use of *s(i)e* (as in (20)) presupposes an already-shared perspective on the referent on the part of speaker and addressee, whereas *tää...* (as in (19)) has the effect of “the speaker ‘placing’ the addressee next to him/her and imposing his/her perspective on the addressee in order for both of them eventually to end up sharing the speaker’s perspective”. In cognitive-affective terms, given that such a referent is deemed important enough for the speaker to bring the addressee in close to him/her, the former “(possibly inadvertently) displays a potentially positive attitude to this

referent”. In the case of the use of *tuo* as in (18), in Laury’s (1997) terms, the speaker is placing the referent outside of his/her current sphere, aligning him/herself with the addressee in doing so. At the same time, according to Östman (1995: 270), “the speaker’s negative attitude towards the referent under discussion is clearly displayed”.

### 3.3 Maes (1996)

Maes (1996) offers a very interesting proposal for accounting for the Dutch (and by implication English and other languages) demonstrative determiners. His approach is part semantic, part pragmatic, and is based on a detailed study of several corpora of written texts, from a variety of genres. I will concentrate on the pragmatic dimension of his proposal, which works for all the data in the present corpus. Basically, Maes is saying that all demonstratives presuppose the existence of their referent in some referential domain, of which there are basically two. The first is the utterance-level domain of the speaker/writer who is producing an act of discourse in the default deictic context of the here and now. Maes calls this the *deictic reference domain* (DRD). Secondly, there are a variety of *other reference domains* (ORD) which are defined negatively with respect to the basic DRD, where the speaker is situated (subjectively as well as in terms of the *hic et nunc* of the speech production). The “proximal” form *deze* (‘this’) is associated with the DRD, while the “distal” form *die* (‘that’) operates within the ORD. The DRD is constituted by the coordination points outlined by Bühler (1982: 11) in his deictic field: ‘here’ (position of speaker), ‘now’ (time of utterance), ‘I’ (identity of current speaker). To these, Maes adds the coordination point represented by the text in the written mode (but this is also needed in the spoken mode). As far as ORDs are concerned, these are determined as a function of the three coordination points ‘place’, ‘time’ and ‘reader/addressee’, leaving the speaker or writer out of perspective. Each demonstrative determiner type may function in terms of one or more of the relevant coordination points in each domain of reference. There are two types of subvalues expressible within each domain: so-called ‘actor-oriented’, pragmatic values: [DRD<sub>s/w</sub>] for orientation to speaker/writer, and [ORD<sub>a/r</sub>] for orientation to the addressee or reader. With [DRD<sub>s/w</sub>] the relationship between speaker/writer and addressee/reader is fundamentally unequal, the former imposing their perspective on the latter, while with [ORD<sub>a/r</sub>], the relationship is mutual, equal. Further non-participant values are those involving the material coordinate points (‘p’ for place of utterance, ‘t’ for time of utterance, and ‘d’ for the discourse itself): [DRD<sub>p</sub>], [DRD<sub>t</sub>], [DRD<sub>d</sub>], on the one hand, and [ORD<sub>p</sub>], [ORD<sub>t</sub>], on the other. A gap is of course [ORD<sub>d</sub>], since as we have seen, discourse-deixis may well be realised via *that* forms. The specific, context-dependent interpretations of given occurrences of the demonstratives are then claimed to be a function of



inferences drawn in order to flesh out the bare interpretative framework provided by these domains and the instantiation of their coordination points. Two prototypical examples illustrating each type of domain are the following examples from Maes's work:

- (21) ["self-reference"] Er zijn *dit* jaar [DRD<sub>t</sub>] in *dit* land [DRD<sub>p</sub>] vierhonderdwtintig moorden gepleegd. (Maes 1996: ex. (19), p. 140)  
'This year, four hundred and twenty murders have been committed in this country'
- (22) ["diegetic"<sup>6</sup> narrative] Er was eens een prins<sub>i</sub>. {*Die*/?*Deze*} prins<sub>i</sub> [ORD<sub>vp</sub>] had een kasteel. (Maes 1996: ex. (20), p. 140)  
'Once upon a time there was a prince. {That/This} prince had a castle.'

As Maes points out (1996: 141), the *deze* NPs in (21) (the form *dit* is the neuter variant) associate their referents with the coordinate points 'time' and 'place' of the deictic referential domain of the discourse. We can also note the confirming presence of the present-perfect tense-aspect in both versions of this utterance, placing emphasis on the present relevance of the past-time events evoked. Replacing the *deze/this* NPs here with *die/that* NPs would destroy this association (and would presumably result in an incoherent viewpoint on the events involved, if the present-perfect tense-aspect is retained). In (22), however, the *die/that* NP associates the referent with the coordination points 'time' and 'place' of a non-deictic, or "other" referential domain [ORD] which is evoked by the content of the text itself - the story being told. Note here the co-presence of the simple definite past tense, which corroborates the non-deictic (in the strict sense) value of the *die/that* NP.<sup>7</sup> Maes suggests that the *deze/this* NP variant would be unacceptable or highly marked in this context,<sup>8</sup> but in fact my feeling as regards the English forms is that *this* NP is not only acceptable, but preferable to the *that* NP counterpart which Maes suggests is the default choice here in Dutch. One can indeed paraphrase the discourse value of the *deze/this* NP variant here as 'The prince about whom I'm telling you here and now'.

But the [ORD<sub>vp</sub>] association isn't restricted to diegetic story-telling discourse, since in other types of discourse, where for example the real world is evoked, *die/that* NPs with the value [ORD<sub>vp</sub>] often suggest factuality. Examples involving English *that* from the present study would be (8), where the use of contrastively-accented *THAT* in its predication context assumes that for the great majority of people in Britain at the time, it *was* an established fact that Prince Charles would not in fact become king one day. Similar considerations hold for the occurrences of pronoun *that* in (10), (12) and (13), and for *that*

<sup>6</sup> That is, "having to do with the narrated content of a story of some kind" (Genette, 1972 : 72).

<sup>7</sup> See Lapaire & Rotgé (1991: 65-6) for further elaboration of this correlation between the use of one or other of the two demonstrative form types at issue, and the choice of a given tense type.

<sup>8</sup> An anonymous *ELL* reader agreed with Maes's judgement here for Dutch.

*incredibly bright light* in (3), and *that decision* in (11). In the case of the occurrence of *this* in (9), and of *this guy Louie Gelman* in (15), we are clearly firmly within the primary deictic domain of the speaker managing his discourse on the spot. The speaker's personal involvement with his reference is well in evidence in both these cases. Note also the imperative form of the verb of which the pronoun *this* is an argument in (9), and the present tense in the left-detached presentational construction in (15), with the switch to the definite past when the narrative proper begins in the following, main conjoined clauses.

Interestingly, if we look again at example (7), which I presented as an instance of discourse-deixis, it is clear that the "speaker-distancing" form *that* rather than the "speaker-identificational" form *this* was chosen because the context of this use is that of indirect, not direct, speech. So even though the reference is being made to something which has just been mentioned, since the speaker in question is (re-)telling an event in which she was involved, she is placing herself vicariously in that situation but her origo is located within the (re-)telling, the narration, not in the original speech situation narrated - hence the use of *that* rather than *this*. The referential context is therefore of type [ORD<sub>t/p/d</sub>]. *This* could have been used here, but characteristically with a different value: it would have had the effect of switching the origo and hence the indexical ground to the original speech event.

Concerning the "relational" uses, Maes noted a clear patterning in the frequency of occurrence in different types of written texts in his corpora: preponderantly, *deze/this* NPs occurred in texts which can be independently characterized as "unequal" in terms of the writer-reader relationship (expository texts, leaflets and brochures explaining certain official rules or regulations or instructing the reader to do certain things), while *die/that* NPs were most common in book or TV programme reviews, autobiography extracts and personal comments on actual events. Most of these texts were narrative and factual in orientation, but also fairly informal in tone, suggesting an equal, mutual relationship between writer and reader. Hence we can see that *this* vs. *that* patterning in natural discourse is determined both by global features of the discourse as a whole, as well as by local factors having to do with the speaker/writer's specific discourse-interactive intention in producing a particular utterance at a given point in the text.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Let's now take stock. The principles underlying the "basic" use of the English demonstratives (and possibly also those of other languages as well) do not correspond to their "situational" use in terms of the current utterance situation where the intended referent is physically present and is indicated by means of forms specifically encoding the relative spatial distance of that referent in relation to the speaker, the addressee, or both. Instead, they

correspond to an “empathetic” or “modal” use, involving the expression of the speaker’s attitude towards the referent, as well as of a particular discourse stance with respect to the addressee. It is in this particular use (considered “derived” and “secondary”, even marginal, by proponents of the standard account of the use of the demonstratives) that the cognitive-interactional underpinning of these form-types is most evident.

In using *this* (in its plural as well as singular form, and whether occurring as a determiner or as a pronoun), the speaker is establishing the referent cognitively within his/her discourse sphere, thereby tacitly associating and involving him/herself with it. The values manifested through the other types of use we have seen earlier flow from this condition: designata physically present within the situation of utterance which are relatively close to the speaker’s location; referents derived co-textually from a highly topical text segment just produced, or from one which is just about to be produced (see example (9)); those introduced forcefully into a spoken narrative and which are signalled as about to assume some importance in the subsequent discourse (example (15)); and uses where the speaker is marking his/her intention to continue a current turn in a conversation.

In using determiner/pronoun *that*, whether singular or plural, on the other hand, the speaker is signalling that the intended referent is not cognitively or subjectively within his/her discourse sphere, though this use may well indicate that s/he is aligning her/himself with the addressee. From this condition flow the other types of use of this form: the fact that its designata physically present within the situation of utterance are relatively far from the speaker’s location (and possibly also from the addressee’s) (see example (3)); that they are anchored within a shared experience represented in long-term memory (see examples (5) and (6)); that they are derived co-textually from within a text segment which is not topical (i.e. which is outside the current threshold of attention of the discourse participants) (see examples (7)-(8a)); or that they signal the end of the current turn in a conversation or of a discourse segment more generally.

Looking back at the Columbia School account of the three-way distinction between *this*, *that* and *it*, which was briefly mentioned in the discussion of Strauss’s (1993) account of these forms in §3.1 (see (17)), we can now say that the scale of attention-focussing signalled by each of these forms can be seen as deriving from their individual cognitive-interactive values. If the use of *this* signals that the speaker is placing the referent within his/her subjective discourse sphere, then this referent is given the status of an entity for which the speaker is claiming responsibility, in discourse terms. Thus the “greater insistence” or “urging” on the speaker’s part that the addressee attend to the referent may be predicted. On the other hand, if the use of *that* signals that the speaker is placing the referent outside of his/her subjective discourse sphere, and at the same time aligns him/herself with the addressee in doing so

(cf. Maes's [ORD<sub>a/r</sub>]), then it is predicted that the referent, though pointed at demonstratively, belongs (in a discourse sense) "equally" to the addressee/reader and to the speaker/writer, and therefore the addressee needs to expend somewhat less cognitive effort on retrieving it. Note that these differences do not necessarily also imply a difference in degree of *importance* of the referent concerned to the discourse at hand, contrary to what Strauss (1993) claims.

Finally, unstressed *it* (which is in fact unstressable, unlike the two demonstrative members of the system), being in addition non-demonstrative in form, clearly has the lowest degree of attention-directing potential of the three forms. Like Finnish *s(i)e*, it conveys the basic presupposition that the attention of the discourse partners is already focussed on the intended referent (which is topical to a degree), where the referent constitutes shared information. Unlike Finnish *s(i)e*, however, English *it* conveys no indication that the referent is located within the addressee's discourse sphere. Hence it is predicted that, of the three indexical forms under discussion, the pronoun *it* will convey the lowest degree of insistent pointing towards the intended referent, since its location within the current discourse segment is assumed already to be in focus.

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